Besides economic analyses of the main economic policy approaches the BSR also reviews underlying constitutional issues which have evolved over the last 400 years contributing to a constitutional structure that is not fully democratic in the sense of supporting participatory development of economic policies involving the electorate. The constituency remains isolated from the very decisions that determine their wellbeing, options and basic freedoms.

Amongst several interesting analyses, this Review unravels many myths about the influence of the voting constituency, political parties and parliament over macroeconomic policy; they have virtually no influence over such decisions.

The macroeconomic policy power base

Contrary to the notions and misleading information put out by political parties and members of parliament, the power of decision making of the constituency of the United Kingdom, over the design and operation of existing macroeconomic policy frameworks, is next to zero.

Who determines macroeconomic policy? Source: "Macroeconomics" section of the BSR editorial drafts.

Such decisions lie almost exclusively in the hands of unelected officials in an independent Bank of England, the Treasury and a single member of the Cabinet, the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The main influence over these decisions does not lie in parliament but rather, with the interests of banks, hedge funds, corporations and the shareholders of these entities who make up a tiny faction of the constituency.

The BSR makes use of diagrams to illustrate the power centres influencing different aspects of the economy and constitutionmal mechanisms that impact the lives and wellbeing of constituents. Most of these decisions make no direct reference to, nor take into account, the constituents of the United Kingdom. The outcome, as has been reported widely, has been rising income disparity, falls in investment in the real economy, declining real incomes and a massive inflation in the value of assets held by a tiny but powerful minority of the electorate.

The diagram on the left appears in the section of the British Strategic Review dealing with macroeconomic policy making. As can be seen the constituents and even parliament do not fall within the zones of influence over macroeconomic policy or monetary policy in particular.

The BSR is extending an analysis developed by Anthony Sampson in his exceptional book, "The Anatomy of Britain", first published in 1962. Much has changed since the last update of that book in 2004. The BSR brings much of the coverage of the Anatomy of Britain up to date but in a more detailed analytical manner with respect to underlying economic and constitutional theory and the evidence of outcomes in practice. The BSR succeeds in identifying those issues of concern with respect to constituent wellbeing that are a direct result of our constitutional structures and practice and economic policies.

The BSR goes further in presenting propositions for ways of reorganizing our constitutional basis for representation of the constituency as well as transparent analyses of relevant economic theory and policies for macroeconomic management to remove the significant democratic deficits in a system that remains so un-responsive to constituency needs.

The BSR will be published in Q4, 2020.

The online vendors for this publication will be posted on this site when this informaton has been supplied by Hambrook Publishing Company (HPC).

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¹ Anthony Sampson (1926 – 2004); Ref: Sampson, A., "An Anatomy of Britain", 1962 and various updated versions as: Anatomy of Britain today (1965), The New Anatomy of Britain (1971), Changing Anatomy of Britain (1982), The Essential Anatomy of Britain: Democracy in Crisis (1992), Who Runs This Place? The Anatomy of Britain in the 21st Century (2004)

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¹ Hector McNeill is the Director of SEEL-Systems Engineering Economics Lab.

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