The recent exchanges between Bank of England representatives and the Treasury Committee contained a good deal of waffle. The BoE expressed surprise and disappointment in the fact that the government's super-deductions do not appear to have had the impact on investment and productivity that was expected.

This lack of impact was entirely predictable from past evidence as well as over 40 years of Real Income Policy development.

In the parallel attempt by both the Reagan and Thatcher administrations to introduce so-called supply side economics of reducing marginal tax rates, most of the windfall funds ended up in the pockets of executives. To be fair, some gains in productivity were obtained in some companies but the associated raising of interest rates to unprecedented levels killed off any serious raising for finance for investment. In fact, in both cases, these policies resulted in severe prejudice with thousands losing homes and family farms as a result of repossession.

It was the likely associated prejudice created by conventional policies that motivated the initiation of development of what became the Real Incomes Approach in 1975. Almost 47 years of development of real incomes theory and policy propositions have been undertaken. Also, I have worked for a similar period dealing directly on international investment project design, management, appraisal and end of cycle evaluations.